By Assane Gueye, Jean C. Walrand, Venkat Anantharam (auth.), Tansu Alpcan, Levente Buttyán, John S. Baras (eds.)

ISBN-10: 3642171974

ISBN-13: 9783642171970

Securing advanced and networked structures has turn into more and more very important as those platforms play an imperative function in smooth lifestyles on the flip of the - formation age. at the same time, protection of ubiquitous verbal exchange, info, and computing poses novel examine demanding situations. protection is a multi-faceted challenge as a result complexity of underlying undefined, software program, and community inter- pendencies in addition to human and social components. It comprises choice making on a number of degrees and a number of time scales, given the restricted assets on hand to either malicious attackers and directors protecting networked platforms. - cision and online game conception presents a wealthy set of analyticalmethods and methods to deal with a variety of source allocation and decision-making difficulties bobbing up in safety. This edited quantity includes the contributions provided on the inaugural convention on choice and video game thought for safeguard - GameSec 2010. those 18 articles (12 complete and six brief papers) are thematically classified into the next six sections: – “Security investments and making plans” comprises articles, which current optimization tools for (security) investments whilst dealing with adversaries. – “Privacy and anonymity” has 3 articles discussing place privateness, - line anonymity, and financial features of privateness. – “Adversarial and strong keep an eye on” includes 3 articles, which examine safety and robustness elements of keep an eye on in networks. – “Networksecurityandbotnets”hasfourarticlesfocusingondefensivestra- giesagainstbotnetsaswellasdetectionofmaliciousadversariesinnetworks. – “Authorizationandauthentication”hasanarticleonpasswordpracticesand one other one offering a game-theoretic authorization version. – “Theory and algorithms for defense” includes 4 articles on a number of th- retic and algorithmic facets of security.

**Read or Download Decision and Game Theory for Security: First International Conference, GameSec 2010, Berlin, Germany, November 22-23, 2010. Proceedings PDF**

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**Extra info for Decision and Game Theory for Security: First International Conference, GameSec 2010, Berlin, Germany, November 22-23, 2010. Proceedings**

**Sample text**

Pentest? t=2 4. defend? t=1 3. attacked? t=0 2. successful? 26 ... T1 ∗ T2 ∗ ∗ T2 ∗ T2 ∗ ∗ T2 ∗ .. T2 T1 k= T2 T2 T1 0 T1 T0 proactive ... ... S .. ... T1 T1 ... T1 T2 ... T1 T1 ... T1 T2 ... reactive defense Fig. 2. Extensive form of the optimization problem ... Optimal Information Security Investment with Penetration Testing 27 Theorem 1. Once the defender starts pentesting, she will keep doing it until a secure state is reached. Proof. We use Lemma 1 proven in the appendix. It gives us the following expression for the total proﬁt of a defender as a function of the initial defense k, the set of rounds in which pentests are commissioned M = {m1 , .

3. The ﬁgures show a schematic representation with inﬁnitesimally small rounds. The costs are proportional to the shaded areas deﬁned by the asset value a, the loss due to attacks z, the total number of weak links K, the number of proactive defenses k, the cost of a pentest c and the probability of a successful pentest p. The ﬁrst ﬁgure shows the case when no pentests are commissioned and the weak links are discovered one-by-one until all K are protected. During this time, the attacker loots (K − k) · a · z proﬁt from the asset.

Finally, if cs is neither too high nor too low and cim small, players’ best 46 M. Humbert et al. responses do not converge to a pure-strategy NE, leading to a mixed-strategy NE as deﬁned in the theorem. We will now extend the C1 -game to the CK -game for K intersections. The CK -game can be viewed as a supergame with K simultaneous moves as deﬁned in [24]. Because the strategy proﬁles are independent at diﬀerent intersections and the set of strategies is not restricted by any constraints, both players can determine their best responses with C1 -games at K intersections and aggregate them to get their CK -game best responses.

### Decision and Game Theory for Security: First International Conference, GameSec 2010, Berlin, Germany, November 22-23, 2010. Proceedings by Assane Gueye, Jean C. Walrand, Venkat Anantharam (auth.), Tansu Alpcan, Levente Buttyán, John S. Baras (eds.)

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